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


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PROPAGANDA: Moral-Political  
Preparation of the Population  
for War

MAJ JOHN T. BANKS 1980

GARMISCH, GERMANY

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MORAL-POLITICAL PREPARATION OF THE POPULATION FOR WAR

MAJOR JOHN T. BANKS

June 1980

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A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "John G. Canyock".

JOHN G. CANYOCK  
LTC, MI  
Commanding

## SUMMARY

In addition to its operational mission, civil defense in the Soviet Union plays an important part in the moral-political preparation of the population for war. In attempting to carry out this task, Soviet civil defense propagandists have emphasized imminent threat from aggressors, the justification of the Soviet civil defense effort, the need for vigilance, the reinforcement of confidence in the regime, and the reinforcement of confidence in civil defense preparations.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The expansion of civil defense programs in the Soviet Union has caught the attention of strategic planners and political observers in the West. Their response has been mixed. Some have found it to be ultimately inconsequential. With one eye cocked toward the possibility of a resurgence of enthusiasm for similar programs in the West, they have denigrated the Soviet effort as wasteful and useless, and they have subtly indicated that excessive attention given to these efforts will further erode US-Soviet detente and threaten the future of arms control.<sup>1</sup>

Others, who are not so sanguine about the merits of detente, have seen the Soviet effort as a serious threat to the American strategic nuclear force. They fear that a unilateral, effective Soviet civil defense program will undermine the credibility of the US's retaliatory force by denying it the ability to inflict "unacceptable damage" on Soviet military and industrial targets. They foresee a nuclear exchange resulting in a relatively low level of casualties in the Soviet Union compared with the casualties sustained by the United States, and they feel that this perception negates the deterrent effect of an "assured destruction" strategy. Furthermore, their concern is aggravated by the dynamic context of the US-Soviet strategic nuclear posture during the last decade. They maintain that the growing investment in Soviet civil defense coupled with the increased prestige and doctrinal importance given to that branch has been more than matched by continued Soviet development of modern strategic weapon systems. And all this has occurred at a time when US strategic doctrine continues to disavow the necessity of civil defense and when most efforts by the US to modernize its forces have been stillborn.<sup>2</sup>

Most studies of the Soviet civil defense effort have focused on the technical capabilities and strategic implication of the Soviet program. Consequently, the operational tasks, organization, and capabilities of the Soviet civil defense organization are well documented, but very little has been written about the ancillary, political roles it performs. When these roles are mentioned, it is usually only in passing reference.<sup>3</sup>

There are reasons for this. The operational functions are of greater immediate concern to the practitioner, and they more readily lend themselves to precise definition. Subordinate functions affecting the political, social, or military-strategic substructure are much more diffuse. Their immediate effect on policy is less predictable, if noticeable at all, and their long-term effects often may be so intertwined in self-perpetuating relationships with other environmental factors that they cannot easily be separated. And even if these effects can be separated, they cannot be easily manipulated.

### Purpose

This paper will examine the role of civil defense propaganda in the "moral-political preparation of the population for war." To accomplish this, the following questions will be addressed: What historical experiences and theoretical principles guide Soviet civil defense propaganda and educational efforts? What themes are most evident? What message do these themes deliver? What feelings do they attempt to elicit?

### Method

An examination of Soviet civil defense propaganda themes devoted to psychological



preparation for war could be achieved best by the analysis of speeches, texts, visual displays, and class lectures prepared for delivery to the general populace at mandatory training periods in schools; at functions held in the workplace or other communal assembly; and through the radio, television, and newspapers found in the home. Unfortunately, this material is not readily available. The source which one might assume to be the most helpful, the general-readership newspaper, is a disappointment. Very little space is given to civil defense topics in these newspapers, and the regional disparity in the little attention that is given makes the problem even more acute.<sup>4</sup> When articles on civil defense do appear, they often pertain to technical, operational, or training matters. While these are instructive, they do not provide a data base large enough to extract recurrent moral-political themes. As a result, this study is based on themes found in written articles or speech texts prepared chiefly for the volunteers in the civil defense organization.<sup>5</sup> These have been supplemented by some material from general-readership newspapers and other sources. While this may inject a certain degree of bias, it is assumed that only the degree of emphasis, as opposed to the thematic content, will be affected. For this reason, no attempt has been made to establish an order of importance among the themes discussed.

The assumption is made that the themes directed at volunteers in the civil defense organization are similar to those directed at the general population. In the first place, civil defense volunteers are not isolated from the remainder of the population; different themes very likely would bring about dissonance and disbelief. Secondly, much of the material published for civil defense workers is used to prepare lesson plans, speeches, and other presentations given to the populace.

The remainder of this paper consists of three parts. The first briefly reviews the growth of the civil defense organization and its gradual integration into the Soviet defense system. It also presents the theoretical basis for civil defense in Soviet military strategy and doctrine. The second part develops the themes pertaining to the preparation of the population for war found in the Soviet press. The final part evaluates the role performed by these themes.

## II. THE DEVELOPMENT AND THEORY OF CIVIL DEFENSE IN THE SOVIET UNION

### Early Development of the Civil Defense Organization

Interest in civil defense in the Soviet Union first appeared in the 1920's, but a civil defense organization was not established until 1932. Sparked by the threat of a revival of German militarism under Hitler, the Soviet regime approved the Statute on the Air Defense of the Territory of the USSR in October of that year. This statute authorized the formation of a decentralized system of civil defense called Local Anti-aircraft defense (MPVO).<sup>6</sup>

MPVO was initially assigned to the Air Defense Administration of the Red Army Staff, and was given the task of protecting selected installations of crucial economic importance to the national economy. MPVO operations were conducted chiefly by volunteers trained by Osoaviakhim, a para-military organization which two decades later would become known as the All-Union Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy (DOSAAF).<sup>7</sup>

MPVO was transferred from the Red Army Staff to the Peoples Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) shortly after the invasion of Poland in 1939; it remained an adjunct of this organization and the NKVD's successor, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), until 1961. During the war this relationship with the NKVD was to MPVO's benefit since the NKVD also controlled all police and firefighting organizations in the nation. The title "Local Anti-aircraft Defense," however, was somewhat of a misnomer. The defensive measures used were passive, and close coordination with other community protection services proved to be more valuable than association with the active military services.

The Great Patriotic War proved to be invaluable to the MPVO; it gained for itself cadres, heroes, experience, and prestige. But even more important, it gained a legal precedent for training the population in civil defense procedures. The USSR Council of Peoples Commissars issued a decree on the General Obligatory Training of the Population for Anti-aircraft Defense in mid-1941. All men from 16 years to 60 and all women from 18 to 50 were required to take part in civil defense training. The mandatory civil defense training for the population taught today is an extension of this earlier law.<sup>8</sup>

The immediate problem facing MPVO after the war was its attitude of listless indolence produced by institutional success mixed with an unusual Soviet response to the advent of nuclear weapons. The experiences learned during the hard years of war predominated Soviet civil defense training and planning. Shelters remained the primary means of passive defense, and evacuation and dispersal procedures were virtually ignored. Given the impetus of World War II experiences among civil defense cadres, it is not surprising that training, operations, and planning in the immediate post-war years were devoid of imagination despite the qualitative change in the threat. In any event, whatever imagination that might have seeped through would have been extinguished by the unusual stance which Stalin took toward nuclear weapons. By publicly ignoring their importance, Stalin denied MPVO the opportunity to effectively educate its cadres in nuclear defense. Worse still, Stalin's attitude denied that organization the opportunity to develop and test new ideas for defense against these weapons.

The period from 1949 to 1961 was marked by two distinct, countervailing trends: the diminution of MVD control of civil defense combined with a growing centralization in civil defense structure and organization. Both occurred simultaneously,

with no discrete event wholly marking the transition. A reorganization of civil defense in 1949 reduced somewhat the control exercised by the MVD, especially in the lower levels of the organization. The introduction of topics relating to nuclear weapons defense in 1954 fostered a minor revolution in Soviet civil defense planning and propaganda; for the first time the effects of nuclear weapons were openly discussed in civil defense manuals. Shortly thereafter the leadership admitted the ineffectiveness of the old emphasis on shelters to protect the population and turned toward evacuation and dispersal as the chief means of passive defense against nuclear weapons. As these changes occurred, Soviet leaders became more aware of the spotty nature of civil defense effectiveness. Nuclear war demanded the protection of the entire population and the mobilization of that population for recovery. The parochial nature of the MVD's function did not contribute to the fulfillment of these needs.

Even more important, Stalin's death resulted in the gradual decline in the power held by the internal security forces.<sup>9</sup> This was felt in most aspects of Soviet life, and it was equally evident in the civil defense organization. MVPO strany (strany means "of the country"), as it was renamed in the late 1950's, remained under the nominal control of the MVD, but its higher echelons gradually became occupied by officials of other agencies, and it acquired the extraordinary interest of the Council of Ministers.<sup>10</sup> The last few years of the 1950's were not marked by dramatic changes in the Soviet civil defense posture, but the slow awakening to the significance of nuclear weapons during these years bred a revitalization in Soviet military strategy and doctrine that was to have a dramatic effect on civil defense a decade later.

#### Soviet Strategy and the Theory of Civil Defense

Soviet military thought, languid during the immediate postwar years, slowly began to revive after Stalin's death. Most of the tenets held today were formed by 1962 and appear in the first edition of Sokolovskiy's Military Strategy.<sup>11</sup> Important changes have been noted in later editions, but they do not radically alter the view of war held by the Soviets in 1962.

The introduction of the intercontinental ballistic missile into the US and USSR arsenals prompted Soviet leaders to further reevaluate the nature of a future war. The qualitative change introduced by the ICBM, not to mention the fruits of the "scientific-technical revolution" seen elsewhere in weapon systems, promised that nuclear war would have its own special characteristics.

The Soviets feel that a nuclear war will occur over large areas of the globe and involve most nations. The war may be prolonged, but its initial and most destructive phase, in which both sides exchange nuclear blows, will also be its most decisive.<sup>12</sup> They emphasize that conflict will not be limited to the destruction of the nation's armed forces, but will include attacks with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons deep into the rear areas of the enemy forces and on the enemy's homeland. Economic targets, which are considered the mainstay of an enemy's will to resist, are of extremely high priority. Additionally, attacks will be made on administrative, communications, and population centers in the enemy's homeland.<sup>13</sup>

The population itself is an especially important target, and the "destroying of the morale of the population is one of the main goals of such a war."<sup>14</sup> It affects not only the economic potential of the nation but the very will to continue that struggle. As an article in Voyennyye Znaniya asserts, "there can be no talk of front or rear in a future war, [which]...will be of an enormous spatial,

destructive, and annihilating character."<sup>15</sup>

The use of ICBM's increases the potential for damage by compressing the time in which destruction of the major economic, military, and population targets can be carried out. The possibility for surprise attack, coupled with the inadequacy of present measures for effective active defense against ballistic missiles, subjects all targets to their maximum vulnerability in the earliest hours of a war.<sup>16</sup> With an adequate active defense precluded by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Limitation Treaty, a passive defense that reduces the vulnerability of the population, the nation's critical economic installations, and key government (and Party) leaders offers the nation a greatly improved chance for survival and for victory.<sup>17</sup> Soviet leaders consider it essential that a significant portion of these three elements of national power survive, for war is purposeful behavior. Sokolovskiy stressed this in writing of the necessity "to develop and perfect the ways...[toward] the attainment of victory over the aggressor first of all within the shortest possible time,...[since] the war may drag on and this will demand protracted and all-out exertion of the army and the people."<sup>18</sup>

Victory. In its emphasis on winning, the thrust of the Soviet view of nuclear war departs radically from that held in the West. At least in its expurgated, official version, Soviet thought contains none of the fatalism so prevalent in the West which often reduces nuclear strategy to a sterile cost-benefit analysis or to polemical denunciations. G. M. Malenkov, former Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, once professed disbelief in the ability of any side to win a nuclear war, but his view was discarded with his ouster in 1955.<sup>19</sup> His "destruction of civilization" thesis was repudiated for ideological reasons. "No change in weaponry," it was argued, "...could change the immutable laws of social development, and ...no system but...capitalism would be destroyed by a new world war."<sup>20</sup>

Although it can be argued that Soviet actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 belie these doctrinal assumptions, there has been little indication of a profound change in these presumptions in public statements of policy. During the mid-1960's a few Soviet military leaders criticized an article appearing in the Soviet military press which affirmed the view that the use of nuclear weapons was a "continuation of politics by other means." One argued that "it was a dangerous illusion to think that thermonuclear war would still serve as an instrument of politics and that political goals could be achieved by using nuclear weapons."<sup>21</sup> But this leader, in turn, was severely criticized in a prominent Krasnaya Zvezda article for making an assertion that "is not only in error, but is harmful because it shakes one's assurance in our victory over the aggressor."<sup>22</sup>

The apparent Soviet willingness to face a nuclear war or, at least as the Krasnaya Zvezda article mentioned above hints, to act as though they are willing to do so may stem from its experience as a nation often invaded. In part, this attitude may grow out of the national character, but it also has a basis in the ideological underpinnings of the regime. An acceptance of a fatalistic attitude toward nuclear weapons would imply a rejection or a criticism of Leninist dogma. This point has been publicly stated on a number of occasions. A book selected in 1974 as recommended reading for Soviet military officers, for instance, warns that:

The concept of nuclear fatalism breaks with the Leninist concept of the essence of war...and diminishes the role of the masses, viewing them as a passive object of weapons of mass destruction.<sup>23</sup>

Civil Defense. The eternal dialectic which drives Soviet thought rejects the notion of a defenseless nation. Just as every new development carries the seeds of its own destruction, so does the introduction of a new type of weapon inevitably lay the foundation for the development of forms of defense against it. Soviet writings, asserting their ultimate victory, may be partially nervous bluster, but they also project a quiet assurance that affirms a rational purpose in trying to protect the nation against the effects of weapons of mass destruction.

This defense does not have to be embodied in a new weapon system. The inability of the Soviet anti-ballistic missile technology to counter the ICBM threat did not lead to the abandonment of all defensive programs. Nor, unlike in the US, did the Soviet Union accept elegant but tenuous theories which argued that security is enhanced by mutual vulnerability and only offensive systems capable of inflicting assured destruction are necessary to preserve deterrence.<sup>24</sup> Instead, greater reliance was placed on the use of passive defense measures to reduce the probable effects of a nuclear attack to more acceptable levels.<sup>25</sup> Even though "it is not possible to guarantee that some of the enemy missiles will not penetrate...the air defenses," a Soviet text on civil defense notes, "significant reduction in population losses may be attained...by instituting a comprehensive system of civil defense measures."<sup>26</sup>

The confidence in passive protection exuded by the Soviets is unsettling. It is difficult to determine whether this confidence is purposeful or given in innocence. On the one hand, Sokolovskiy can threaten that "the mass use of nuclear, particularly thermonuclear, weapons will impart to the world an unprecedented destructive nature. Entire countries will be wiped off the face of the earth."<sup>27</sup> Yet Marshal Chuykov, the Chief of Civil Defense, USSR from 1961 until 1972, claimed that although nuclear weapons "are called mass weapons, with knowledge and skillful use of modern defense measures they will not injure the masses but only those who neglect...the use of these [civil defense] measures."<sup>28</sup>

The apparent contradiction between Soviet threats of nuclear destruction and their claims about the effectiveness of their civil defense confounds the discovery of their true sentiment. It leads the Western observer to rely more on his own fears and reasoning than on what the Soviets constantly tell themselves.<sup>29</sup> Nevertheless, it seems clear that the operational code determining Soviet military expenditures, preparations, and operations assumes that a nuclear war is survivable. As a part of this, civil defense seems to enjoy high visibility. Although the Soviets may not be able to provide complete protection, their professed aim to do so remains unswerving. The Soviets have never accepted the idea that defense and deterrence might be mutually exclusive. Instead, their doctrines have stressed preparation across the entire spectrum of weapon technology.<sup>30</sup> It is the side that is most prepared, they feel, that will win the war.

Preparation. The meaning of the word "strategy" is at once abused and neglected in the West. In practice it is considered something a nation does after hostilities have commenced. It should be more than this. In contrast, the Soviets have adopted a broader view towards this concept. Much of their concern for a usable, effective strategy is an attempt to prepare for war--not any particular war, just the next one. These preparations are intended to assure:

The possibility of repelling the aggressor at any moment and of inflicting on him a shattering retaliatory nuclear strike for the purpose of seizing the strategic initiative; the attaining of victory in the shortest possible time; the ability to "hold out" against the massive nuclear strikes of the enemy with the fewest possible losses; and maintaining a high moral-political state of the population and bolstering its determination to

achieve victory.<sup>31</sup>

Preparations are made in three general areas: the armed forces, the economy, and the population. Among the population there are again three types of preparatory actions to be taken during peacetime. These are "the moral-political preparation of the population," the "preparation for defense against weapons of mass destruction and for the removal of the results of this attack," and the "military preparation of the population."<sup>32</sup>

The civil defense program is the formal means through which the second category of preparations is achieved. The significance of civil defense work, however, does not just rest here. All three of these means of preparation are served, in varying degrees, by civil defense. Likewise, other civil, military, para-military, and Party organizations promote these preparatory efforts in a strongly interwoven network of mutually supporting purposes, cadres, and methods. DOSAAF training, for example, provides a sizeable population familiar with basic military skills. Some of these skilled individuals can be used by the civil defense organization to man its para-military units and to train its volunteers. The training provided by DOSAAF (and civil defense, as will be noted later) also lends support to the moral-political preparation of the populace.

Whatever the ultimate intent of the Soviet leaders may be, the preparations they are making for war bolsters the credibility of Soviet military strategy. It also points again toward the overriding objective of winning a nuclear war should it occur. "Victory in war is entirely unthinkable," Sokolovskiy has written, "without thorough and timely preparation of the nation and the armed forces in it."<sup>33</sup>

#### Civil Defense Organization Under the New Strategy

Most of the arguments forwarded by Sokolovskiy were not new, but the acceptance of such a coherent body of strategic thought--and its incorporation into doctrine--renewed the strength of many of the themes which had been ignored in the immediate postwar years. Nevertheless, the adoption of these views on strategy and war caused considerable upheaval within the Soviet Armed Forces. Future war was to be not only nuclear but also fought with conventional forces.<sup>34</sup> The traditional distinction between the front and the economic base of a nation could not be maintained. Although this distinction had been partially erased by the use of air power in World War II, the virtual certainty of the use of nuclear weapons caused a quantum increase in the level of danger to which the rear areas would be subjected.

General of the Army A. T. Altunin, Chief of Civil Defense, USSR, recalled the changes wrought by this revolution; it was recognized, he noted, that the absence of a distinction between the front and the rear called for a new type of civil defense structure designed to protect both the economy and the population.<sup>35</sup> It would entail the "creation of a state-wide defense system that, led by the Communist Party...and under a unified military command, could work in coordination with the armed forces to insure, with the active participation of the entire population," the continued existence of the state under any conceivable wartime condition.<sup>36</sup>

The transfer of the civil defense organization from the MVD was completed in 1961. The demands on the civil defense organization in performing its passive defense role as a complement to the armed forces' offensive and active defense capability argued for a closer association with these branches. MPVO strany was

transferred to the Ministry of Defense, and its name was changed to Civil Defense, USSR. Its new chief, Marshal Chuykov, accepted the charter from the Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers directing it to prepare the civil defense organization for wartime and disaster-relief missions.<sup>37</sup>

In the ensuing years Soviet civil defense has grown steadily in effectiveness. Mandatory training in civil defense has been expanded and greater effort has been made to provide practical, rather than theoretical, exercises. Full-time civil defense mechanized units were formed, and in the mid-1960's an officer candidate school for these forces was founded. Training and propaganda efforts, spurred by recognition at the 23rd, 24th, and 25th Party Congresses, have continued to expand, albeit with numerous shortcomings.<sup>38</sup>

The replacement in 1972 of Chuykov by Altunin, a man 21 years his junior, closely coincided with another round of reforms within the civil defense establishment. While a few Western observers have interpreted this change in leadership as an indication of dissatisfaction with Chuykov's performance, it appears most likely to have been a normal retirement of an aging leader accompanied by increased Ministry of Defense and Party interest in the civil defense function.

Since his accession to civil defense leadership, Altunin has enjoyed a series of personal honors--promotion to General of the Army in 1977 and selection to the Central Committee in 1976 are the two most notable--that are hardly coincidental. Civil Defense, USSR, has also enjoyed increased prestige within the Ministry of Defense. Although it is not considered one of the five established branches of the Soviet Armed Forces, the attention which the military press gives to promoting the close bonds between the front and rear and the emphasis on the essential nature of civil defense as an adjunct to the armed forces attests to its newfound importance.<sup>39</sup>

### III. THEMES IN SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE PROPAGANDA

Sokolovskiy asserts that the task of civil defense in the Soviet Union is to support the nation's preparation of its people for war. To do this it must develop the technical competence to "defend against weapons of mass destruction," and "remove the results of [a nuclear]...attack" should one occur.<sup>40</sup> The pro forma mission of the civil defense organization is virtually synonymous with Sokolovskiy's vision. Soviet civil defense manuals outline the three basic goals of the organization as:

1. protecting the population from weapons of mass destruction;
2. preparing the national economy for work stability under conditions of enemy attack;
3. conducting urgent rescue and emergency restoration operations at sites of destruction.<sup>41</sup>

The individual tasks required by these goals are quite exhaustive, but the Soviet Union has continued to assert its willingness to see them carried out. The Soviets have developed comprehensive plans for civil defense based on dispersal, evacuation, and protection of the population and key economic enterprises. Support for these plans are provided not only by volunteers but also by regular civil defense formations capable of providing specialized assistance in disaster control, decontamination, survey and monitoring, and recovery operations.<sup>42</sup>

The stress on the technical aspects of the civil defense mission is misleading since it ignores the important role civil defense plays in the psychological preparation of the population for war (i.e., the moral-political preparation discussed earlier). The reason for this disregard is readily apparent: the announcement of such an intent would deny it the spontaneity it needs to be effective.

The threat of the employment of nuclear weapons has increased considerably the difficulties of civil defense personnel. The technical problems caused by the destructive power of these weapons is awesome, but they still might be surmounted by the commitment of large quantities of resources. The attitudes of the population, however, are more insidious and difficult to handle. The perception of an extremely high probability of death in a nuclear war coupled with a commonsensical skepticism toward the efficacy of defensive measures and a sense of futility, even despair, over the long-term prospect of existence for the survivors of such a war have rendered the population largely apathetic towards civil defense programs.<sup>43</sup>

The problems associated with motivating the population to prepare for civil defense is especially severe in the West. Over the years many of these governments seem to have acquired the public's revulsion toward nuclear war and have avoided the problems of postwar survival. Instead of confronting public opinion, leaders have adopted military strategies and doctrines that conform to these prejudices. The Soviet Union has avoided this approach. The control it maintains over the educational, economic, and social institutions of the nation have permitted its leaders to better direct attitudes to support their desired policies.

Although the Soviet leaders take great care to point out the total support their civil defense policies have among the population, they are aware of problems concerning human motivation on civil defense matters. The serious attention they



give to these problems belies their apparent self-confidence. A recent article in Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal stressed the Party's interest in the "multifaceted activity of the government, state, and military agencies...which are creating and improving not only the material but also the spiritual basis of the country's defensive capability..."<sup>44</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, expressed this concern in Leninskim Kursom:

We all understand the enormous significance of the country's defensive and economic potential, the society's morale and political condition and the spiritual and moral makeup of the people--on which, incidentally, the strength of defense depends to a great extent--are of no less importance...<sup>45</sup>

Brezhnev's "spiritual and moral makeup of the people" is synonymous with the "moral-political" quality and the "psychological preparedness" of the population. These concepts continually appear as goals to which agitation and propaganda sections of particular government and Party organizations aspire. They also appear as integral parts of the regime's more abstract intent to form a "Communist world view and [instill] high moral-psychological qualities in the Soviet people..."<sup>46</sup> As General Major A. Korzhavin, Chief of Propaganda for Civil Defense, USSR, noted, these qualities:

...of the Soviet people are formed by the entire social structure of Soviet life, by the entire course of affairs in society and, most of all, by purposeful and persistent ideological and indoctrinational work by the Party and all its organizations.<sup>47</sup>

The holistic nature of these qualities and the broad, diffuse responsibility for their inculcation notwithstanding, civil defense's contribution has been quite specific. Its educational and propaganda effort in the past three years have focused on the following themes: 1) maintaining a sense of imminent hostility; 2) justifying Soviet civil defense efforts as a humanistic concern for the population; 3) encouraging greater vigilance and increased preparedness among the population and in civil defense units; 4) reinforcing confidence in Party and government leadership; and 5) reinforcing confidence in civil defense plans, equipment, and leaders.

#### Imminent Threat

Since the mid-1970's Soviet criticism of the United States in civil defense materials has warned the Soviet citizen of the growing tendency of US leaders to revert to Cold War attitudes. In doing so, the US leadership has been depicted as rejecting peace and the prospects of peaceful coexistence. Occasionally the criticism unintentionally reveals the proximate cause of this hardening of US attitudes. A. Sutankin and I. Kravtsov, propagandists for the Estonian civil defense staff, claim that "enemies" of peaceful coexistence refuse to abandon Cold War attitudes out of a spiteful "desire to halt the victorious march of socialism [and] to change in their favor the correlation of forces in the world. They [i.e., the US leaders] shout at the top of their voices about the 'growing Soviet threat'," thus fueling the arms race.<sup>48</sup> The shaming tone of the article is ironic; the authors simultaneously admit that change in the "correlation of forces" in favor of the Soviets has occurred while ostensibly failing to recognize the catalytic effect this change has had on US policy.

Altunin offers a similar accusation, but he neglects to explain the cause of change in Western US attitudes.

More and more signs are mounting that representatives of those groups who are striving to turn the world back to the "Cold War" and to unrestrained military competition and confrontation with the Soviet Union and with all the countries in the socialist community are beginning to gain the upper hand.<sup>49</sup>

He continues by accusing the US and, to a lesser extent, other NATO nations of using an imagined arms gap in various spheres of military competition to elicit greater support for arms production. The USSR, the reader is assured, is drawn into this "race with the West" just to keep up.<sup>50</sup>

Altunin describes the threat of Western arms in fanciful detail. He cites recent attempts by certain, unnamed leaders in the United States to publicize an illusory civil defense "lag" in order to "exhort additional appropriations from Congress, to dupe the taxpayer, and to take new steps to strengthen" a civil defense system which long ago began assuming "greater fundamental strategic importance."<sup>51</sup> His description of the US civil defense system, in a publication directed toward civil defense cadre, DOSAAF members, and others interested in the Soviet Armed Forces, makes it compare favorably with the USSR's: federal control centers containing 30 days supply of rations, fuel, water, and other supplies; construction underway for warning and control centers for all local government agencies; an established national warning system; surveyed underground protective shelters for 200 million persons; enhancement of industrial protection and dispersal capability in progress; growth of non-military civil defense formations; and an entire population engaging in civil defense training.<sup>52</sup> The description is of a highly effective system that has provoked and justified the recent emphasis given to Soviet civil defense. Altunin assures the reader that:

The imperialist will be waiting in vain for us to sit idle in the face of such facts. The Soviet people know from their own bitter experience what enormous sacrifices among the population the actions of an aggressor can cause. And they, of course, will take the appropriate measures for protection. The civil defense measures being implemented by us, said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, are aimed at insuring the safety of the peaceful population in event of war.<sup>53</sup>

Soviet civil defense propagandists apparently consider the "threat" to be a highly useful tool for motivating civil defense cadres and to publicize the need for civil defense among the population. General Major Korzhavin recently explained in Sovetskiy Patriot, the official newspaper of DOSAAF, that civil defense information programs must not only stress the mission of civil defense in a national emergency and the humanistic nature of this mission, it must also "unmask the aggressive policies of the reactionary circles of imperialism as well as the dangerous nature of the hegemonic aspirations of the Peking leaders."<sup>54</sup>

#### Justification of the Soviet Civil Defense Effort

A concerted effort is made to associate Party and government action in response to Western provocation with a strict concern for moral behavior and peaceful intent. An article in Voyennyye Znaniya, outlining the civil defense topics to be taught to secondary school students, stresses that Party and government responses to increased spending on arms in the West, "while continually following the peaceful course of the Leninist foreign policy," aims at the further strengthening of the nation's defenses.<sup>55</sup>

This desire to pursue a "peaceful course" has attracted inordinate attention. An unattributed article in Voyennyye Znaniya indignantly rebukes American and

other Western newspaper reports for attempting to "paint the civil defense measures conducted in [the Soviet Union] in a bad light...Nobody," the article continues, "will succeed in smearing the human aims of Soviet civil defense."<sup>56</sup> Another article bids the propagandist to "disclose the humanistic, common-national aims and tasks [of civil defense] and the effectiveness of its measures."<sup>57</sup> It is necessary to:

...explain logically the humane nature of our civil defense goals. The imperialist circles are trying to misinterpret its true goals. Despite the real facts, they portray the matter as if it had some potential danger for the countries in the West: "It threatens to disrupt the strategic alignment of forces." However, it is no secret to anyone: protecting people from the barbarous weapons of an aggressor is the main task of our country's civil defense. What could be more humane and important? The carrying out of this task impels Soviet patriots to determination and persistency.<sup>58</sup>

The constant reference to the "humane" or "humanistic" goals of Soviet civil defense is an attempt to present the demands placed on the cadre, the volunteers, and the population in a morally acceptable manner. Even if such an inducement is not an effective motivator during wartime, it may be effective as a symbolic reward for the often tedious, peacetime training and service in which the citizen must participate. Secondly, it reinforces the image of good and evil represented in civil defense propaganda. A nation professing peaceful intentions must have an acceptable reason for justifying increased defense expenditures.

#### Vigilance

Soviet military doctrine has placed a high degree of importance on readiness, especially since the introduction of the ICBM. One of the most critical tasks of the leadership in this decade, notes General Colonel Gayvoronskiy, Deputy Chief of the Military Academy of the General Staff, "is to find effective measures directed at insuring high combat readiness of the troops and other forces..."<sup>59</sup> The concept of constant readiness applies not only to the Soviet Armed Forces; it is also considered important for the general population. Civil defense cadres and other citizens are constantly reminded of the suddenness with which nuclear war can occur, the preparedness of the Soviet Armed Forces, and the need for this preparedness to be matched by unremitting vigilance at home.

The constant reference to vigilance presents an interesting insight into the Party's view of its own history. What is left unsaid is often more revealing than what is mentioned. It is remarkable that an article containing material to be presented for political training periods manages to review the roots of the "vigilance of the Soviet people" and completely ignore the foggy events surrounding Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union while including references to the "vigilance of the Russian proletariat and its Bolshevik party" formed in the struggle against the Czar, during the Civil War, and in the first years of the Soviet state.<sup>60</sup> A more thoughtful article appearing in Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal nervously dismisses the early years of the Second World War in a similar manner:

In the years preceeding the Great Patriotic War, the decisive (material and spiritual) foundation for the Soviet Armed Forces' combat readiness were created in the USSR. In the final analysis, this also predetermined our victory over the forces of fascism.<sup>61</sup>

The passing mention of this dismal period of Soviet history is to be expected considering the inability of the Party to confess error. But this absence is still a glaring admission of failure. As if to compensate for this and to reaffirm confidence in the Party and the armed forces, Soviet civil defense propagandists tend to characterize the Soviet nation as being simultaneously vigilant and in need of greater watchfulness. The exhortations to heightened readiness, especially among the para-military organizations and the general populace, have a peculiar ring, a noticeable stridency, that runs counter to the constant reassertions of the Party's (or the government's) confidence in their vigilance.

### Reinforcing Confidence in the Regime

The efforts to prepare the populace for war include inculcating and reinforcing values that support a smooth peacetime transition to war, the performance of one's duty during wartime, and the reconstruction of the old order in a postwar environment. In support of these objectives Soviet civil defense propaganda, agitation, and education efforts (as well as those of other para-military and civilian organizations, e.g., DOSAAF, Znaniye Society, etc.) foster support for the Party and government organizations, confidence in the Soviet Armed Forces' ability to perform their mission, and the growth of heroic values among the civil defense personnel.

If confidence and faith in the regime is instilled, it is not done by subtle reference and suggestion. It is a benevolent, paternalistic Party apparatus that is depicted as being interested in thwarting rapacious, greedy Western nations. General Colonel V. Grekov, Deputy Chief for Political Affairs, Civil Defense, USSR, disregarded all modesty when he wrote the following:

A situation favorable for the growth and expression of worker's abilities has been created everywhere now thanks to the Party-approved considerate and respectful attitude towards cadres. Trust in and respect for people are being combined by correct demands.<sup>62</sup>

In this context it is the Party and the organizational work which the Party directs that instills the supposed qualities necessary to function in a nuclear environment--qualities such as "Communist fiber and conviction [which] serve as the spiritual foundation for a person's psychological training and [which] give his feelings social direction."<sup>63</sup>

As the same time a close link is established between the Party and traditional Soviet patriotism. In doing this, the Party is presented as an instrument of internationalism and Soviet nationalism. For example:

Establishing in the minds of the working people and above all the younger generation the ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, pride in the land of the Soviets, in our motherland, and readiness to defend socialism's achievements...has been and remains one of the Party's most important tasks.<sup>64</sup>

Although the major effort among cadres emphasizes "indoctrinating ideological conviction and loyalty" to the Party's cause, the overall goal among the population is to reassure and to instill confidence in its actions.<sup>65</sup> The message reminds the citizen that it is the Party's uncompromising vigilance which directs

the improvements in defense and the correction of weaknesses. The inference made is that the fundamental weakness of the individual is offset by the strength and wisdom of the Party.

Confidence in the Armed Forces. The attitude civil defense propaganda takes toward the Soviet Armed Forces is equally unambiguous. A great deal of effort has gone into convincing the citizen of the unity of Soviet patriotism and the responsibility of the citizen to defend his motherland.<sup>66</sup> In doing this Soviet propagandists are often found waving the bloody shirt. An article in Rabochaya Gazeta reminds the reader that "there certainly is not a family in our country that has not been united by blood ties to the Soviet Army," and it exhorts the nation's youth to continue the military traditions of their fathers.<sup>67</sup> Efforts are made to promote interest in the Soviet Armed Forces and to impress the populace with their might. This is done to establish a "faith in the invincibility of" the Soviet Armed Forces in order to maintain the "high moral spirit and... courage" of the civil defense formations and the population during a nuclear war.<sup>68</sup>

The flattery given to the military is not surprising. In the first place, belief in the heroism and fidelity of the uniformed services enhances the reputation of the civil defense organization since it is itself subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. Secondly, the civil defense cadre contains a high proportion of retired servicemen. It is understandable if their background leads them to idealize the Armed Forces.

Symbolic Support. To support these themes, indoctrination has also evolved into numerous symbolic rituals conducted by the civil defense units. These include ceremonial departures for youth being called to military service, meetings with heroes of the Great Patriotic War, and special movies and ceremonies recognizing the combat and revolutionary traditions of the Armed Forces.<sup>69</sup>

The use of the heroic model is especially commonplace. A popular example is the narrative of a meeting between a reporter and a former wartime hero who now has a post in some local civil defense organization (usually a deputy or in a propaganda post). Military virtues are stressed: "I met him [F. Zayats, a plant civil defense chief of staff, for example] somewhat later...The man appeared military in everything...his bearing was parade-like." Later the reader discovers that Zayats had been senior to Altunin during the war and that during his visit the Civil Defense Chief greeted him warmly.<sup>70</sup>

#### Reinforcing Confidence in Civil Defense Preparations

It was noted earlier in this paper that the fear of nuclear war can have a debilitating effect on the will to defend against it. The prospect of the total destruction it brings and the fear of the unknown effects it may have on man and the environment makes it difficult for the public to pay attention to civil defense instructions, let alone commit themselves to an organization whose very existence confronts the harsh threat of weapons of mass destruction. This sense of fatalism may affect a portion of the civil defense cadres and the populace in the Soviet Union. A recent article notes that there still remain "people who have an incorrect idea about the possibility of defense. The significant increase in the devastating force of nuclear weapons...make some people feel that death is inevitable for all who are in the strike area."<sup>71</sup> This fatalism, however, is not considered an objective response to the threat since "there is not nor can there ever be a weapon from which there is no defense."<sup>72</sup>

Soviet civil defense policy asserts that the means for this protection are available; one need only show more confidence in them. One article claims that "with knowledge and skillful use of present-day procedure, each person can not only preserve his own life but also actively work at his enterprise...The only one who suffers is he who neglects his civil defense studies."<sup>73</sup>

Two versions of this "confidence" theme appear. The first is only indirectly related to the civil defense role in the preparation of the population for war. It involves themes directed at building confidence for actual tasks to be performed during civil defense training and in actual emergencies. It is a response to the strongly-held feeling that well-prepared and trained individuals (both technically and psychologically) are likely to react in a more stable, decisive, and confident manner than one who is not so prepared.<sup>74</sup> Consequently, Soviet civil defense training is becoming more realistic. Efforts to support this include the use of pyrotechnic devices in training, operating under radio interference, requiring chemical and nuclear protection equipment to be worn for extended periods and during tests.<sup>75</sup>

The second variant of the "confidence" theme is the propaganda and educational equivalent of the measures described above. It is an effort to instill in the general public and civil defense formations a sense of confidence in the entire civil defense system. No effort is made to hide the more widely known threats posed by nuclear weapons, but there is also no room given to doomsday speculation. All the properties of a nuclear explosion are dissected, and then an antidote is promptly offered. The tone of the material is reassuring; it signals the reader or listener that everything is under control.

The mandatory instructions given to secondary school students present a fairly detailed analysis of the destructive capability of nuclear and chemical weapons, but these capabilities are always matched by presentations showing the protection offered by civil defense equipment and procedures.<sup>76</sup> An article on the Second All-Russian Civil Defense Festival of Amateur Film and Slides described the winning entry as a presentation of the effects of nuclear weapons that was followed by footage which "convincingly showed that there are reliable protection methods against [the destructive effects], and that it is only necessary to use them skillfully and act correctly and efficiently when the civil defense alarm sounds."<sup>77</sup>

Even the description of the nuclear effects is presented with a comforting air of certainty. A guide for civil defense instructors directs that the description of the shock effect of a nuclear explosion be presented as follows:

It is considered that with an air explosion a distance of R is safe for an unprotected person. Those persons who are in an open slit trench will not be injured even at a distance of two-thirds R from the explosion epicenter. A covered trench reduces the casualty radius by double, while a shelter protects people even better if they are near the epicenter.<sup>78</sup>

The facts as presented may be technically true, but the certainty with which they are spoken is deceptive. And it may be deceptively effective among an audience that has no recourse to more skeptical opinion.

## VI. CONCLUSIONS

It is evident that during the past thirty years Soviet civil defense has emerged from the relative obscurity of being an adjunct of the internal security forces to a position of importance within the Ministry of Defense. Today Civil Defense, USSR plays a critical role in the Soviet military readiness system.

The main function of civil defense is the preparation for defense against an attack by weapons of mass destruction, and it is to this end that most of the efforts of the organization are directed. But the civil defense organization, especially its propaganda and educational organs, also performs another function: it contributes to that which Sokolovskiy called the "moral-political preparation of the population."

The nature of civil defense gives the organization much public exposure. Its access to the population through newspapers, television, films, and in the classroom, especially in the mandatory civil defense classes, makes it a particularly useful vehicle for instilling political-moral and psychological preparedness.

A survey of Soviet civil defense propaganda and educational materials published between 1977 and 1979 indicate that the following thematic categories exist: imminent hostility, justification of the Soviet civil defense effort, exhortations to greater vigilance, reinforcement of confidence in the Party and government, and reinforcement of confidence in the civil defense program.

A review of these themes permits the following observations. First, civil defense propaganda appears useful as a component of the larger effort (by other Party and government organizations) to prepare the population for war. Beyond the ubiquitous calling for renewed support for the Party and government, these themes are aimed at drawing forth concern about a threat to the nation, respect for and confidence in the efforts of the leadership to meet this threat, and appreciation for the regime's humanistic respect for its subjects. The message is simple: "We are being threatened, but the power of the nation is so great that we have little to fear if we maintain our guard."

Secondly, these themes stress the immediate need for action and participation. They attempt to elicit greater interest and involvement by associating civil defense work with nationalism and the fulfillment of patriotic duty in answering the call for greater vigilance.

Third, while one can reasonably determine the effect desired by the civil defense propagandists, it is not possible to determine what effect was achieved. The stridency and fervor of this material is evident to the eye of the Western observer, but the Soviet citizen who reads and hears the same messages day after day may dismiss them as being only "background noise."

The preceding sections presented the themes in civil defense propaganda, but no effort has been made to determine why these themes appeared. Are they topics common to all organizations involved in moral-political preparation of the populace? Perhaps they indicate problems bothering the civil defense leadership. The emphasis that has been given to vigilance might lead one to suggest that the lack of vigilance or interest in certain civil defense programs is a real concern to civil defense leaders. Similarly, the conservative manner in which descriptions of nuclear effects are presented suggests that leaders might fear a backlash if less

optimistic explanations were given. The articles cited earlier criticizing a fatalistic attitude toward nuclear survival attests to the existence of this problem. In spite of these attitudes, or maybe because of them, grob (a Soviet slang acronym for grazhdanskaya oborona, i.e., civil defense; also the Russian word for "the grave") will remain a visible part of Soviet life.



## FOOTNOTES

1. See David C. Gompert, "Strategic Deterioration: Prospects, Dimensions, and Responses in a Fourth Nuclear Regime," Nuclear Weapons and World Politics, ed. David C. Gompert, et al. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1977), pp. 225-226; Sidney D. Drell, "Civil Defense in Limited War--A Debate: Opposed," Nuclear Strategy and National Security Points of View, eds. Robert J. Pranger and Roger P. Labrie (Washington: AEI, 1977), pp. 377-384.
2. See Leon Goure, Civil Defense in the Soviet Union (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962); Leon Goure, Soviet Civil Defense--Urban Evacuation and Dispersal (Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1972); Harriet F. Scott, Civil Defense in the USSR (Unpublished PhD dissertation, George Washington University, 1974); T. K. Jones, "Statement to the Civil Defense Panel," Civil Defense Review: Hearings by the Civil Defense Panel of the Subcommittee on Investigations of the House of Representatives, 94th Cong., 2nd Session (Washington: GPO, 1976), pp. 206-282.
3. David R. Jones, "Civil Defense," Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, ed. David R. Jones, Vol. II (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1978), p. 291.
4. John A. Wyrwas, Soviet Civil Defense 1975-76, Student Research Report (Garmisch, USARI, 1977), p. 2.
5. The monthly journal Voyennyye Znaniya contains a large section devoted to civil defense affairs. Note: The term "volunteers" is used to represent all unpaid, part-time civil defense workers. It is not meant to imply that participation was necessarily freely chosen.
6. David R. Jones, p. 292.
7. Osoaviakhim is an acronym for the Society for the Assistance of Defense, Aviation, and Chemical Organizations. It was a voluntary, military-patriotic organization existing in the USSR between 1927 and 1948. It was a forerunner to DOSAAF. DOSAAF is a voluntary, military-patriotic youth organization. Members participate in recreational and training activities which emphasize skills useful to the military, e.g., skiing, marksmanship, electronics, navigation, driving. Also see David R. Jones, p. 292.
8. David R. Jones, pp. 292-293.
9. Ibid.
10. "Vekhi istorii grazhdanskoy oborony SSSR," Voyennyye Znaniya, No. 3 (1977), pp. 22-23.
11. V. D. Sokolovskiy, Military Strategy, 3rd Edition, translated by Harriet F. Scott (Menlo Park, CA: Stanford Research Institute, 1971), pp. 14-16.
12. P. T. Yegorov, I. A. Shlyaknov, and N. I. Alabin, Grazhdanskaya Oborona (Moskva: Vysshaya Shkola, 1977), p. 8.

13. Ibid., p. 9.
14. Ibid., p. 10.
15. D. Shuvyrov, "Sistema nadezhnaya effektivnaya," Voyennyye Znaniya, No. 10 (1968), p. 17.
16. Sokolovskiy, p. 247 and Yegorov, p. 8.
17. John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: the Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1973), pp. 273-281.
18. Sokolovskiy, p. 253.
19. Leon Goure, Foy D. Kohler, and Mose L. Harvey, The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy (Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1974), p. xv.
20. A. Altunin, "Idti vpered," Voyennyye Znaniya, No. 10 (1974), p. 6.
21. Sokolovskiy, p. 207. This quotation is contained in a comment inserted by the translator, Harriet F. Scott.
22. Ibid.
23. A. S. Milovidov (ed.), The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War (Moscow, 1972), translated and published by the US Air Force (Washington: GPO, 1974), p. 128.
24. Nuclear defense systems have their champions and critics in the US. Opponents of strategic defense are largely responsible for the US signing the ABM Treaty in 1972. Those who believe that defense strengthens deterrence often agree that mutually vulnerability might theoretically provide deterrence, but they feel that "unilateral vulnerability most certainly would not." Since there is no historical assurance of stasis in weapons technology, proponents of strategic defense advocate readiness across the entire range of defensive and offensive weapons in order to guarantee continued deterrence. See John M. Collins, American and Soviet Military Trends Since the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington: Georgetown University, 1978), pp. 127-128.
25. There is also considerable debate among US analysts whether the Soviet civil defense program is attempting to reduce expected casualties in wartime to politically acceptable levels or only provide a hedge against the failure of deterrence. Sides taken correlate closely (and directly) with the analysts' opinions of the efficacy of the Soviet civil defense program. See Civil Preparedness Review, Part II: Industrial Defense and Nuclear Attack, Report by the Joint Committee on Defense Production, Congress of the United States, 95th Cong., 1st Session, April 1977 (Washington: GPO, 1977), pp. 15-30, 55-100.
26. Yegorov, p. 10.
27. Sokolovskiy, p. 252.
28. V. Chuykov, "Nashe obshcheye delo--grazhdanskaya oborona," Nauka i Zhizn', No. 1 (1968), p. 45.

29. T. K. Jones considers many American attitudes toward nuclear weapons to be based on popular misconceptions of the damage which these weapons are able to inflict. Such attitudes, he asserts, become congealed in the belief that nuclear war is "unthinkable." T. K. Jones, pp. 206-224, 259-261.
30. Collins, p. 130.
31. Sokolovskiy, p. 352.
32. Ibid., pp. 375-376.
33. Ibid., p. 352.
34. This key point was first noted in Sokolovskiy's third edition to Military Strategy (1968). Earlier editions did not emphasize the importance of conventional forces in nuclear war.
35. Soviet ranks differ slightly from those used in the United States. The following chart compares these ranks:

| <u>Soviet Rank</u>                                 | <u>American Rank</u> |
|--|----------------------|
| Marshal of the Soviet Union                        | General of the Army  |
| General of the Army/Marshal (of<br>a specific arm) | General              |
| General Colonel                                    | Lieutenant General   |
| General Lieutenant                                 | Major General        |
| General Major                                      | Brigadier General    |

36. "Vekhi istorii grazhdanskoy oborony SSSR," p. 22.
37. David R. Jones, pp. 293-295.
38. Ibid., pp. 296-297.
39. Ibid., p. 296.
40. Sokolovskiy, pp. 375-376.
41. Yegorov, pp. 10-12.
42. In 1977 the US government estimated the strength of these units at 50,000-72,000. Civil Preparedness Review, p. 70.
43. Collins, pp. 127-129; T. K. Jones, pp. 206-214; "Delo kazhdogo," Voyennyye Znaniya, No. 5 (1978), p. 33.
44. Ye. Nikitin and B. Kanevskiy, "Problemy oboronosposobnosti strany i boyevoy gotovnosti Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v voyennoy politike KPSS," Voyenno-istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No. 9 (1978), p. 5.
45. L. I. Brezhnev, Leninskim Kursom, Vol. III (Moskva: Politizdat, 1972), p. 349.
46. Ibid.

70. I. Kalinin, "Poklonites' muzhestvu!" Voyennyye Znaniya, No. 1 (1978) p. 20.
71. "Delo kazhdogo," p. 33.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Korzhavin, "Reshayushchaya sila," p. 18.
75. P. Vasikov, Vosnove uspekha--kompleksnyy podkhod," Voyennyye Znaniya, No. 6 (1978), p. 14.
76. Civil defense instructors are given the experiences of V. Ivanikhin, a military instructor in one of Moscow's schools, as an example of how nuclear effects should be taught:

Then during questioning the students described the next destructive factor of a nuclear explosion, light radiation. In persons who are outside of shelters it can cause burns and temporary blinding for 5-30 minutes. Vision gradually returns. The light does not penetrate through nontransparent materials, and for this reason any obstacle which creates a shadow to a certain degree provides protection against the direct impact of light radiation and burns. But in order to prevent mass fires, it is essential to promptly carry out protective fire prevention measures. The military instructor briefly lists precisely which ones they are.

A. Kostrov, "Oruzhiye massovogo porazheniya," Voyennyye Znaniya, No. 12 (1977), as translated in Translations on USSR Military Affairs, No. 1331 (JPRS 70645), 16 February 1978, pp. 115-116.

77. "Vesomyy vklad kinolyubiteley," Voyennyye Znaniya, No. 1 (1978) p. 23.
78. Kostrov, p. 31. Underline added.

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